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1	Introduction
The	2007–2009	financial	crisis	 is	widely	recognized	as	the	most	severe	global	economic	downtu (delete	please)rn	since	the	Great	Depression	(see	for	example,	Mian	and	Sufi,	2009;	Melvin	and	Taylor,	2009;	
Obstfeld,	2012).	The	crisis	originated	from	the	US	in	2007	and	has	affected	markets	and	institutions	at	the	core	of	the	financial	system	around	the	world	(see	for	example,	Majid	and	Kassim,	2009;	Brozoza-Brzezing	and	Makarski,	2011;
Mala	and	Chand,	2012;	Jones	et	al.,	2012;	Flannery	et	al.,	2013).	In	the	United	Kingdom,	the	effect	of	the	financial	crisis	became	evident	in	the	aftermath	of	an	increased	number	of	defaults	in	the	financial	sector,	such	as,	Northern
Rock,	Bradford	and	Bingley,	Alliance	and	Leicester,	HBOS	and	a	number	of	other	building	societies	(Hall,	2008,	2009).
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Abstract
This	study	examines	the	effects	of	 lending	constraints	on	the	 financial	policies	of	UK	publicly	 listed	companies	during	the	2007–2009	financial	crisis.	Using	a	sample	of	2039	publicly	 listed	 firms,	 the	results	of	our
analysis	indicate	that	financial	policies	of	firms	are	sensitive	to	variations	in	the	supply	of	external	finance	and	credit,	suggesting	that	liquidity-constraint	firms	with	low	cash	reserves	suffered	more	at	the	time	of	the	credit
crunch.	While	managing	through	the	potential	negative	effects	of	the	financial	crisis,	majority	of	the	sample	companies	increased	the	use	of	internal	finance	and	deferred	the	payments	of	dividends	which	helped	them	apply
effective	financial	policies	during	the	crisis	period.	The	findings	of	this	study	also	document	that	during	the	crisis	period,	financial	policies	of	firms	were	exposed	to	variations	in	the	supply	of	finance	and	credit,	which,	by
implication,	posed	a	threat	to	their	operations,	sustainability	and	growth.	Our	findings	produce	awareness	about	the	negative	effects	of	the	non-availability	of	external	finance	and	credit	supply	to	listed	companies,	and	signify
the	role	of	different	financing	channels	and	credit	system	in	the	operations	and	growth	of	listed	companies.	These	findings	have	implications	for	financial	regulation	and	policy	making	in	the	UK.
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The	 increased	number	of	defaults	has	raised	awareness	concerning	risk	management	on	the	part	of	 financial	 institutions.	As	a	result,	 financial	 institutions	have	become	more	cautious	and	are	taking	various	measures	 for
reducing	risk	in	their	lending	activities.	Predominantly	banks	have	tightened	lending	through	imposing	more	complex	terms	and	conditions.	This	raises	the	concern	that	disruptions	in	lending	may	have	caused	significant	shocks	to	the
supply	of	credit,	which	militate	against	the	corporate	investment	and	operational	undertakings	(Nanda	and	Nicholas,	2013).	Thus	the	depth	and	scale	of	the	potential	impacts	of	the	financial	crisis	on	the	corporate	sector	have	helped
engender	a	growing	body	of	research	with	a	particular	reference	to	the	effects	of	the	financial	crisis	(see	for	example,	Saleem,	2009;	Leary,	2009;	Lemmon	and	Roberts,	2010;	Lin	and	Paravisini,	2013;	Mac	an	Bhaird,	2013;	Yarovaya
and	Lau,	2016;	Cevik	et	al.,	2016;	Jiang,	2017).
In	this	regard,	Lemmon	and	Roberts	(2010)	investigate	the	shocks	to	the	junk	bond	market	caused	by	regulation	changes	and	the	collapse	of	Drexel	Burnham	Lambert	in	1990s,	and	the	subsequent	effects	on	the	leverage	and
investment	decisions	of	firms	which	borrowed	from	that	market.	Their	results	 indicate	that	aggregate	external	financing	activities	were	squeezed,	and	the	financing	and	investment	decisions	of	below	investment	grade	firms	were
affected	as	a	result	of	financial	crisis	of	that	time.	Similarly,	Voutsinas	and	Werner	(2011),	Carey	et	al. 	(2012),	and	Forsberg	(2012),	show	that	the	capital	structure	of	firms	is	sensitive	to	variations	in	the	supply	of	credit.	However,
Campello	et	al.,	(2012)	indicate	that	the	average	size	of	available	credit	lines	did	not	change	during	the	crisis	period	in	Europe.	All	these	findings	thus	present	mixed	and	inconclusive	evidence	on	this	issue.
While	recognizing	existing	literature’s	substantial	contribution,	we	submit	that	material	shortcomings	remain.	Firstly,	these	relate	most	notably	to	unduly	limited	examination	of	capital	structure	in	response	to	credit	shocks.
The	existing	literature	has	not	adequately	explored	the	role	of	individual	components	of	capital	structure	and	as	a	result	the	findings	are	not	able	to	fully	identify	which	component	of	capital	structure	is	more	sensitive	to	credit	supply
contractions	as	compared	to	another.	Secondly,	existing	studies	on	financial	crisis	are	predominantly	based	on	the	US	market.	However,	it	has	been	recognized	by	the	existing	literature	that	there	are	institutional	differences	in	terms	of
culture,	insolvency	code,	tax	system,	accounting	regulation	and	ownership	structure	between	the	US	and	other	economies	of	the	world	(see	for	example,	Franks	et	al.,	1996;	Dahya	and	Travlos,	2000;	Beattie	et	al.,	2006;	Akbar	et	al.,
2011).	Investigating	the	financial	policies	of	publicly	listed	firms	during	the	2007–2009	financial	crisis	with	data	from	the	UK	economic	system	is	therefore	expected	to	provide	new	insights.
It	is	therefore	evident	from	the	above	discussions	that	due	to	institutional	and	cultural	differences	between	the	US	and	other	countries,	the	applicability	of	research	findings	from	US	data	is	limited	to	other	economies.	It	is	thus
argued	that	the	impact	of	variations	in	the	supply	of	credit	on	the	financial	policies	of	firms	outside	the	US	needs	examination.	Accordingly,	we	carry	out	this	investigation	for	the	generation	of	new	evidence	on	this	issue	by	employing	a
sample	of	UK	publicly	listed	companies.	We	consider	the	UK	for	this	investigation	because	UK	has	one	of	the	largest	stock	markets	outside	of	the	US,	which	provides	a	different	institutional	setting	and	regulations.	In	addition,	despite
the	severe	implications	of	the	current	financial	crisis	on	the	UK	economy	there	is	still	little	evidence	available	on	these	issues	in	the	UK.	We	therefore	address	the	following	research	questions	in	this	paper.
1. Is	there	any	effect	of	credit	supply	contractions	on	the	financial	policies	of	public	firms	in	the	United	Kingdom?
2. How	does	shock	to	the	supply	of	credit	affect	the	leverage	ratios	of	publicly	listed	firms	in	the	United	Kingdom?
3. Which	component	of	capital	structure	is	affected	the	most	by	the	credit	supply	contractions?
4. Does	publicly	listed	firms	in	the	United	Kingdom	switched	to	alternative	sources	of	finance	during	the	period	of	credit	supply	contractions?
Keeping	the	above	questions	in	mind	and	in	order	to	investigate	the	contemporary	effect	of	the	financial	crisis	on	the	financial	policies	of	UK	public	firms	this	study	uses	a	sample	of	2039	publicly	listed	firms	over	the	period
between	2004	and	2009.	We	take	a	closer	look	at	the	impact	of	the	financial	crisis	on	the	capital	structure	by	making	a	detailed	analyses	of	the	debt	components	and	other	sources	of	finance	with	a	view	to	identify	the	channels	through
which	the	supply	shock	travels.	Our	empirical	strategy	enables	us	to	identify	how	publicly	listed	firms	minimized	the	effect	of	credit	contractions	by	resorting	to	alternative	sources	of	finance	such	as	internal	funds,	net	debt	issue,	trade
credit	and	net	equity	issue.	In	particular,	it	helped	us	gain	enhanced	understanding	of	the	extent	of	substitution	across	credit	sources.	This	would	also	help	clarify	how	public	firms	manage	their	finances	during	the	crisis	period.
However,	investigating	the	effect	of	credit	supply	shocks	on	firms’	financing	behaviour	poses	identification	problems	because	we	need	to	separate	the	supply	effect	from	the	endogenous	demand	effect.	We	have	tried	to	cover
this	 problem	 from	 three	 different	 perspectives.	 First,	 we	 cover	 the	 identification	 of	 exogenous	 variations	 in	 the	 supply	 of	 credit	 from	 the	 pre-crisis	 to	 the	 crisis	 periods.	 Second,	 we	 adopt	 firm	 fixed	 effects	 models	 to	 control
interdependence	among	variables.	As	our	 study	 is	using	panel	data	 set,	 there	 is	 a	potential	 concern	of	unobserved	heterogeneity,	however,	 fixed	effect	 regression	models	account	 for	 this	problem,	because	 such	models	have	 the
advantage	that	it	accounts	for	both	observable	and	unobservable	firm	characteristics	and	heterogeneity	(Bougheas	et	al.,	2006;	Mateut	et	al.,	2006;	Gan,	2007;	Xiaolou,	2011).	Third,	to	account	for	demand	side	factors,	this	study
includes	firm	level	variables,	which	are	used	as	proxy	for	firm	demand.
The	results	show	that	 financial	crisis	has	negatively	affected	 the	 total	debt	ratio	of	publicly	 listed	 firms.	The	results	 further	highlight	 that	 financial	crisis	has	heterogeneously	 influenced	the	components	of	 firms’	financial
structure,	whose	effects	are	transmitted	through	the	trade	credit	channel	rather	than	the	short	term	and	long-term	financing	channels.	We	conclude	that	financial	policies	of	publicly	listed	firms	are	sensitive	to	variations	in	the	supply
of	credit	during	the	course	of	the	financial	crisis.	The	practical	potential	of	this	study	in	terms	of	policy	making	is	thus	to	inform	the	decision	makers	of	the	monetary	authorities	about	their	attitude	in	corporate	lending.	This	is	more
,
important	at	a	time	like	the	present	when	continuity	and	sustainability	is	uncertain	and	is	subject	to	the	effect	of	global	instability.
The	rest	of	the	paper	is	organized	as	follows.	Section	2	presents	a	review	of	previous	literature	which	contains	discussions	on	both	current	and	classical	studies.	Section	3	discusses	methodology	and	data.	This	section	provides
details	of	the	empirical	strategy	by	highlighting	theoretical	background	of	the	models,	and	description	of	the	data	collection	process,	measurement	of	variables,	and	model	specification	and	econometric	issues.	Section	4	highlights
results	from	the	estimation	of	all	models	where	detailed	commentary	is	provided	and	the	outcome	is	matched	with	the	existing	literature.	Finally,	Section	5	concludes	the	paper	by	presenting	a	short	summary	of	the	study	and	by	citing
some	limitations	and	avenues	for	future	research.
2	Review	of	Lliterature
2.1	Theoretical	Ddevelopments
Theoretical	developments	covering	the	capital	structure	of	firms	originates	from	Modigliani	and	Miller	(1958),	who	argue	that	in	a	perfect	capital	market,	in	the	absence	of	transaction	costs	and	taxes,	the	market	value	of	a	firm
is	depending	upon	its	earning	power	and	risk	of	underlying	assets,	and	is	independent	from	its	capital	structure.	However,	Modigliani	and	Miller	(1963 )	incorporate	tax	advantage	as	a	potential	determinant	of	capital	structure	and
argue	that	firms	can	maximizse	their	value	by	employing	more	debt	in	their	capital	structure	because	of	the	tax	shield	advantage	associated	with	the	use	of	debt	and	that	firms	can	maximise	their	value	by	employing	more	debt	in	their
capital	structure.	In	another	seminal	paper,	 	Miller	(1977)	argues	that	in	a	world	where	interest	payments	are	tax	deductible	the	value	of	the	firm	still	remain	independent	from	its	capital	structure.
Over	the	years	several	theoretical	papers	have	covered	the	notion	of	optimal	capital	structure,	such	as	the	agency	theory	(Jensen	and	Meckling,	1976),	signalling	theory	(Ross,	1977),	the	bankruptcy	cost	theory	(Titman,	1984),	and
the	pecking	order	 theory	 (Myers,	1984;	Myers	and	Majluf,	 1984).	Most	of	 these	and	other	 relevant	 theories	have	relaxed	 the	assumptions	of	perfect	capital	market	and	provided	evidence	 that,	 in	an	 imperfect	capital	market,	 firms’
financing	 	affect	their	value,	suggesting	that	firms’	financing	decisions	matter	in	an	imperfect	capital	market.	Jensen	(1986)	argues	that	debt	financing	reduces	the	conflict	of	interest	between	managers	and	shareholders.	Those
theories	which	are	based	on	information	asymmetry	suggest	that	information	imbalance	plays	a	significant	important	role	in	determining	firms’	optimal	capital	structure	(Bharath	et	al.,	2009).	In	this	regard,	Gatchev	et	al.	(2009)	highlight
that	information	asymmetry	and	agency	cost	play	a	significant	role	in	the	firms’	financing	decisions.
Ardalan	(2008)	however,	regards	the	mainstream	published	academic	literature	in	finance	as	mainly	focusing	upon	the	functionalist	paradigm	which	according	to	the	arguments	raised	in	this	study,	the	classical	finance	theories
do	not	consider.	He	argues	that	the	application	of	other	theoretical	approaches	 in	finance	is	beneficial	 for	enhancing	our	understanding	about	the	nature	of	 issues	covered	in	finance	research.	Similarly,	Ardalan	(2017)	 regards	 the
assumption	about	the	capital	structure	irrelevance	of	firms	as	unrealistic	and	argues	that	as	the	result	of	financial	models	in	the	mainstream	finance	literature	are	based	on	certain	assumptions,	a	change	in	those	assumptions	will	make
the	findings	questionable.	He	argues	that	the	objective	of	a	firm	is	share	price	maximisations,	and	as	debt	as	a	source	of	finance	contains	risk,	the	capital	structure	cannot	be	irrelevant	and	that	there	is	an	optimal	capital	structure	for
firms.
In	relation	to	understanding	the	causes	of	the	recent	financial	crisis,	Lawson	(2009)	regard	existing	theoretical	frameworks	used	by	current	research	papers	as	 	insufficient	and	asks	for	the	establishment	of	a	more	grounded
	framework	for	the	understanding	the	causes	of	the	crisis.	Considering	the	limitation	of	existing	theoretical	literature	(see	for	example,	Modigliani	and	Miller,	1958,	1963	amongst	others),	and	the	arguments	raised	about	the
methodological	limitations	of	the	mainstream	finance	research	(see	for	example,	Ardalan	2008;	Lagoarde-Segot	2016;	Ardalan	2017,	amongst	others),	use	of	a	more	refined	framework	will	be	beneficial	for	understanding	the	causes	and
implications	of	the	crisis.	In	line	with	these	arguments	this	study	constructs	a	model	where	a	firm’s	capital	structure	is	a	function	of	both	demand	and	supply	side	factors.	It	is	therefore	expected	that	the	outcome	of	our	results	will
provide	new	insights	in	this	area	of	research	which	will	help	us	better	understand	the	causes	and	implications	of	the	2007–2009	financial	crisis.	An	overview	of	existing	literature	in	this	area	is	presented	in	sub-Section	2.2	and	2.3
below.
2.2	Credit	Supply	Contractions	and	Firms’	Financing	Msupply	contractions	and	firms’	financing	mix
There	is	abundance	of	theoretical	and	empirical	literature	which	suggests	that	the	financing	mix	of	large	publicly	listed	firms	is	not	sensitive	to	variations	in	the	supply	of	bank	credit.	In	addition,	due	to	the	prevailing	financial
reporting	regulations,	information	in	the	financial	statements	of	publicly	traded	firms	is	generally	regarded	as	reliable	and	true.	As	a	result	listed	firms	have	easier	access	to	wider	channels	for	raising	funds,	such	as,	public	market,
commercial	paper	market,	etc.	(see	for	example,	Blinder	and	Stiglitz,	1983;	Gertler	and	Gilchrist,	1993;	Reinhart	and	Rogoff,	2011).	Even	in	a	tightening	monetary	situation,	the	flow	of	bank	credit	and	non-bank	debt	to	larger	firms	increases
(Gertler	and	Gilchrist,	1993;	 	Acharya	et	al.,	2011).	Similar	findings	are	also	reported	by,	Oliner	and	Rudebusch	(1995),	Kashyap	and	Stein	(2000),	and	Berger	et	al.	(2005)	who	argue	that	the	proportion	of	debt	including
bank	and	non-bank	debt	as	well	as	trade	debt	in	the	capital	structure	of	larger	public	firms	expanded	during	the	monetary	contraction	period.
Several	studies	have	examined	banks’	lending	behaviour	in	the	tight	monetary	period	and	confirmed	that	bank	loans	were	decreased	to	financially-constrained	firms	whereas	to	the	non-financially-constrained	firms	the	amount
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of	loans	increased	(Gertler	and	Gilchrist,	1994;	Oliner	and	Rudebusch,	1995;	Bernanke	et	al.,	1996;	Oliner	and	Rudebusch,	1996).	Similarly,	findings	of	Gertler	and	Gilchrist	(1993)	suggest	that	bank	lending	to	larger	public	firms	are	not	much
affected	following	stringent	monetary	policy.	While	investigating	the	impact	of	the	current	financial	crisis	on	large	public	firms,	Iyer	et	al.	(2010)	argue	that	the	2007–2009	financial	crisis	did	not	significantly	disturb	the	credit	flow	to
large	firms.
The	overall	findings	of	the	above-mentioned	papers	thus	suggest	that	credit	contractions	have	not	significantly	affected	the	financing	mix	of	large	listed	firms.	These	findings	are	also	in	line	with	the	argument	that	listed	firms
maintain	long	track	records,	better	diversification,	economies	of	scale	in	generating	and	reporting	information	and	low	agency	cost	of	external	finance	(Bernanke	et	al.,	1996;	Clarke	et	al.,	2012;	Cull	and	Martinez	Peria,	2013).	In	addition,
information	asymmetry	and	idiosyncratic	risk	are	likely	to	be	low	in	these	firms	and	as	a	result,	these	firms	raise	funds	from	a	number	of	external	sources	of	finance	such	as;	issuing	debt,	equity	and	commercial	papers	in	the	open
market	(Gertler	and	Gilchrist,	1993;	Gertler	and	Gilchrist,	1994;	Holmstrom	and	Tirole,	1997;	Stein,	2003).	Even	they	could	also	avail	the	opportunity	of	reallocating	their	loans	demand	within	the	banking	system	(Bruno,	2009).	It	has	also	been
reported	in	the	literature	that	banks	only	consider	safer	loan	options	during	tight	credit	conditions	(see	for	example,	Lang	and	Nakamura,	1995).
In	contrast	to	the	foregoing,	Lemmon	and	Roberts	(2010)	demonstrate	that	large	public	firms	are	vulnerable	to	the	credit	supply	shocks.	They	find	a	significant	impact	of	the	exogenous	shocks	to	credit	supply	on	the	financing
decisions	of	below	investment-grade	firms	and	observe	more	reduction	of	external	finance	for	such	firms	following	shocks	to	the	supply	of	credit.	They	also	report	that	a	reduction	in	the	supply	of	credit	is	mostly	concentrated	in	the	net
long	term	debt	issuance	category.	They	argue	that	although	the	supply	of	credit	contractions	affects	the	financing	activities	of	below	investment-grade	firms,	their	effect	on	the	leverage	ratio	is	negligible.	Similarly,	Gambacota	and
Marques-Ibanez	(2011)	highlight	that	banks	with	weaker	capital	positions	restricted	the	provision	of	loans	during	the	crisis	period.
In	a	related	context,	Lin	and	Paravisini	(2013)	examine	how	credit	shocks	affect	 firm	financial	and	investment	policies.	They	take	the	bankruptcy	of	the	WorldCom	in	2002	as	a	natural	experiment	to	 investigate	whether	the
WorldCom	events	exert	the	heterogeneous	effect	on	the	US	banks	supply	of	credit,	which,	in	turn,	influence	firms’	external	cost	of	debt	financing.	They	find	that	banks	which	participated	in	syndicate	loans	to	the	WorldCom	firms
reduced	the	supply	of	credit	to	those	firms	more	than	the	non-participating	banks	during	the	post	crisis	period.	The	reduction	was	found	stronger	on	bank-dependent	firms	as	compared	to	other	firms.	Among	the	bank-dependent	firms,
those	firms	whose	main	lenders	were	exposed	to	the	WorldCom	events	face	increased	costs	of	raising	further	bank	finance	due	to	the	adverse	selection	problem.	Similarly,	Voutsinas	and	Werner	(2011)	and	Saretto	and	Tookes	(2013),	show
that	the	capital	structure	of	firms	is	sensitive	to	variations	in	the	supply	of	credit.
After	summarising	findings	of	the	above	mentioned	studies	we	argue	that	the	overall	evidence	is	mixed	and	inconclusive.	It	is	not	clear	from	findings	of	the	existing	studies	as	to	which	components	of	financing	mix	are	more
sensitive	to	variations	in	the	supply	of	credit	as	compared	to	others.	This	specifies	gaps	in	the	existing	literature	which	need	further	investigations.	We	now	discuss	the	behaviour	of	firms	with	respect	to	alternative	sources	of	finance	in
the	next	section.
2.3	Credit	Supply	Contractions	and	Alternative	Sources	of	Fsupply	contractions	and	alternative	sources	of	finance
Some	of	the	latest	research	findings	document	that	when	the	supply	of	external	credit	squeezes,	firms’	substitute	to	alternative	sources	of	finance	in	the	form	of	internal	finance,	debt	(bond	debt),	trade	credit	and	equity	finance
(Leary,	2009;	Campello	et	al.,	2011;	Lin	and	Paravisini,	2012).	These	alternative	sources	of	 finance	serve	as	a	buffer	to	alleviate	credit	constraints	due	to	the	credit	supply	shocks	(Kashyap	et	al.,	1994;	Bae	et	al.,	2002;	Leary,	2009).	In
addition,	findings	of	a	survey	conducted	by	Graham	and	Harvey	(2001)	suggest	that	practitioners	view	‘Financial	Flexibility’	as	an	important	factor	in	deciding	about	the	sources	of	finance	to	use.
One	of	 the	 techniques	of	maintaining	 financial	 flexibility	 is	 the	use	of	 internal	 finance.	 In	 this	 regard,	 the	 importance	of	 internal	 finance	 is	evidenced	 in	 the	Myers	(2001)	 seminal	 report	which	highlights	 that,	 ‘Most	of	 the
aggregate	gross	investment	by	US	nonfinancial	corporations	has	been	financed	from	internal	cash	flow	(depreciation	and	retained	earnings)’.	Similarly,	Acharya	et	al.	(2013)	document	that	at	times	of	higher	risk,	gaining	credit	is	costly	for	firms	and
as	result	they	opt	to	use	internally	generated	cash	for	their	finances.	Likewise,	most	of	the	previous	studies	on	capital	structure	show	that	internal	finance	is	an	important	determinant	of	firms’	financing	decision	(see	for	example,
Jordan	et	al.,	1998;	Ozkan,	2001;	Franks	and	Goyal,	2003;	Panno,	2003).	These	studies	suggest	that	firms	tend	to	rely	more	on	internal	finance,	should	they	face	restricted	access	to	external	finance.
With	respect	to	bond	finance,	it	is	also	documented	in	some	recent	research	findings	that	large	public	firms	substitute	to	bond	finance	when	bank	finance	is	squeezed.	In	this	regard,	the	findings	of	Judge	and	Korzhenitskaya
(2012)	suggest	that	large	firms	are	more	likely	to	immune	themselves	by	resorting	to	bond	finance	when	they	face	restricted	access	to	bank	finance.	Their	other	analyses	are	based	on	the	sub-sample	of	leverage	and	credit	rating,	which
reveals	that	the	effect	of	bank	loan	supply	is	pronounced	on	high	leveraged	and	speculative	grade	firms.
On	the	issue	of	equity	as	an	alternative	source	of	finance,	Kahle	and	Stutz	(2013)	and	Lin	and	Paravisini	(2012)	note	that	firms	are	more	likely	to	substitute	to	equity	finance	and	hold	more	cash	following	negative	shocks	to	bank
credit.	They	regard	an	increase	in	a	firm’s	equity	issue	as	an	indication	towards	a	decline	in	the	firm’s	leverage	and	argue	that	that	cash	holding	of	firms’	increase	immediately	after	the	credit	supply	shocks	which	they	maintain	for	two
years	after	the	shock.	This	finding	is	consistent	with	the	precautionary	saving	motive	which	would	help	firms	during	and	after	the	period	of	credit	contractions.
Some	empirical	studies,	however,	do	not	support	the	notion	that	firms	would	resort	to	alternative	sources	of	finance	when	the	supply	of	credit	squeezes.	In	this	regard,	Campello	et	al.	(2011)	and	Lemmon	and	Roberts	(2010)	find
limited	evidence	regarding	firms’	substitution	towards	alternative	sources	of	finance	such	as	internal	finance,	short	term	debt,	trade	credit,	equity,	and	change	in	dividends	pay-out	following	shocks	to	the	supply	of	credit.	Similarly,
Judge	and	Korzhenitskaya	(2012)	and	Leary	(2009)	find	that	firms,	which	have	access	to	public	debt	market,	are	less	likely	to	use	alternative	sources	of	finance	following	the	credit	crunch	and	argues	that	large	firms	substitute	from	private
to	public	debt	during	tight	monetary	conditions.
On	the	basis	of	the	above	discussions	we	argue	that	the	role	of	alternative	sources	of	finance	during	the	period	of	shocks	to	the	supply	of	credit	is	not	clear	from	the	existing	findings.	Moreover,	findings	of	the	existing	studies
do	not	fully	distinguish	the	sources	of	finance	which	are	sensitive	to	the	credit	supply	shocks	from	those	which	are	not.	In	light	of	this	argument	and	by	considering	the	lack	of	consensus	among	the	findings	of	the	published	literature	in
this	area	a	re-examination	of	this	issue	is	worth	doing.	In	order	to	meet	our	research	objectives	and	to	conduct	a	detailed	investigation	of	all	related	issues	we	discuss	our	research	methodology	and	data	in	the	Section	3	below.
3	Methodology	and	Ddata
3.1	Methodology
In	order	to	investigate	the	effect	of	credit	supply	shocks	on	the	financial	policies	of	UK	public	firms	we	first	consider	the	Modigliani	and	Miller	(1958)	hypothesis	of	a	firm’s	capital	structure	as	a	function	of	various	demand	side
factors	as	the	first	step	in	our	methodology.	In	line	with	this	hypothesis,	many	existing	studies	have	modelled	a	firm’s	financing	mix	as	a	function	of	firm	characteristics	with	respect	to	size,	age	and	growth	as	well	as	its	financial	status
with	respect	to	profitability,	risk,	asset	tangibility	and	liquidity	(see	for	example,	Ozkan,	2001;	Cassar	and	Holmes,	2003;	Daskalakis	and	Psillaki,	2008;	Akbar	et	al.,	2013).	In	a	functional	form	this	can	be	expressed	as	follows.
A	firm’s	capital	structure	function	is	constructed	on	the	basis	of	an	implicit	assumption	that	the	supply	of	capital	is	frictionless,	and	accordingly	any	firm	can	finance	all	value-enhancing	projects.	However,	new	findings	about
capital	market	imperfections	in	recent	years	have	challenged	the	Modigliani	and	Miller’s	(1958)	perfect	capital	market	hypotheses	and	document	that	the	financing	of	firms	depend	on	both	demand	and	supply	factors	(see	for	example,
Sufi,	2009;	Choi	et	al.,	2010;	Lemmon	and	Roberts,	2010).	Similarly,	Ardalan	(2008,	2017),	and	Lagoarde-Segot	(2016)	regard	the	theoretical	assumptions	about	the	capital	structure	irrelevance	of	firms	as	unrealistic	because	a	change	in	those
assumptions	is	making	the	research	findings	questionable,	and	asks	for	the	application	of	other	theoretical	approaches.	Lawson	(2009)	suggests	that	existing	theoretical	frameworks	used	by	current	research	papers	for	understanding
the	causes	of	financial	crisis	are	insufficient	and	asks	for	the	establishment	of	a	more	grounded	framework	for	the	understanding	the	crisis.	We	therefore	construct	a	model	where	a	firm’s	capital	structure	is	a	function	of	both	demand
and	supply	side	factors	as	follows.
Where,	D	 stands	 for	 demand	 shocks	 and	 S	 stands	 for	 supply	 shocks.	On	 estimating	 the	 effect	 of	 credit	 supply	 shocks	 on	 firms’	 financing,	 changes	 in	 capital	 structure	 due	 the	 financial	 crisis	may	 simply	 reflect	 the	 unobserved
shift	in	firms’	demand	for	capital	(Duchin	et	al.,	2010;	Puri	et	al.,	2011).	We	therefore	separate	the	effect	of	supply	shocks	from	the	demand	effect	by	a	three-step	identification	strategy.	First,	as	the	crisis	has	negatively	affected	both	the
supply	and	demand	of	credit	we	identify	external	variations	in	the	supply	of	credit	and	recognise	the	effect	of	credit	supply	shocks	on	the	capital	structure	of	firms	during	the	recent	fincial	crisis.	Second,	in	order	to	overcome	the
problem	of	unobserved	heterogeneity	in	panel	data,	we	have	adopted	firm	fixed	effects	models,	because	it	produces	unbiased	and	consistent	coefficient	estimates	(Jeon	and	Miller,	2004).	Third,	a	set	of	control	variables	have	been	used
for	isolating	the	effect	of	demand	factors,	which	include,	return	on	assets	and	growth	and	their	interaction	with	the	crisis	dummy	as	a	proxy	for	firms’	demand.1.	These	steps	not	only	permit	us	to	identify	the	supply	effects	but	also	help
us	in	separating	the	pre-crisis	effects	from	the	crisis	effects	(see	for	example,	Gan,	2007;	Love	et	al.,	2007;	Sufi,	2009;	Chava	and	Purnanandam,	2011;	Akbar	et	al.,	2013,	amongst	others).
To	capture	the	change	from	pre-crisis	to	the	crisis	period,	we	extend	model	(2)	by	incorporating	interactive	terms	between	the	dummy	variable	representing	the	financial	crisis	and	demand	and	supply	variables.	The	matrix
representation	of	simultaneous	equation	models	is	expressed	below.
Where,	CSit	 is	 a	 vector	 representing	 firms’	 leverage	 ratios;	 Dit	 is	 a	matrix	 of	 firm-level	 control	 variables	 representing	 the	 demand	 side	 factors;	 Crisis	 is	 a	 dummy	 variable	 which	 is	 equal	 to	 1	 for	 the	 period	 2007–2009,	 and	 0
otherwise	 for	 the	period	2004-–2006;	γ1	 is	 the	 coefficient	matrix	 capturing	 the	effect	 of	demand	 side	 factors;	γ2	 is	 the	 coefficient	matrix	 capturing	 the	 credit	 supply	 shock	effect	by	 identifying	 the	extent	 to	which	 firms’	 financial
structure	is	affected	by	the	financial	crisis,	γ3	is	the	coefficient	matrix	of	the	interactive	terms	measuring	the	change	in	demand	factors	during	the	crisis	period	relative	to	the	pre-crisis	period.
Model	(3)	 is	the	benchmark	model	for	the	total	debt	ratio	which	is	regressed	on	both	the	demand	and	supply	side	factors.	We	further	decompose	total	debt	into	long	term	debt,	short	term	debt	and	trade	credit.	The	three
components	of	the	debt	structure	are	then	entered	into	the	equations	as	the	dependent	variables	and	as	a	result	the	following	equations	are	formed.
CS	=	f	(size,	age,	growth,	profitability,	risk,	asset	tangibility,	liquidity) (1)
CS	=	γ0	+	γ1D	+	γ2S	+	εit (2)
CSit	=	γ0	+	γ1*Dit	+	γ2*Crisis	+	γ3*Dit*Crisis	+	εit (3)
Long	term	debt	=	γ0	+	γ11*ROA	+	γ12*	GT	+	γ2*CR	+	γ31*	GT	*CR	+	γ32*	ROA	*CR	+	εit (4)
Next,	we	extend	model	(3)	by	taking	account	of	net	debt	issue,	net	equity	issue,	cash	reserves	and	dividends	which	are	regressed	on	the	control	variables	and	the	supply	side	dummy.	The	resulting	equations	are	reported	as
follows.
3.2	Variables
Total	debt	(CS)	includes	all	interest	bearing	and	capitalized	lease	obligations	and	is	measured	as	the	sum	of	short	term	debt,	long	term	debt	and	trade	credit,	divided	by	total	assets.	Long	term	debt	is	measured	as	all	interest
bearing	financial	obligations,	excluding	those	amounts	which	are	due	for	payment	within	one	year,	divided	by	total	assets.	Short-term	debt	includes	bank	overdraft,	notes	payable	and	the	current	portion	of	 long	term	debt	due	for
payment	within	one	year,	divided	by	total	assets.	Trade	credit	is	taken	as	the	measure	of	trade	credit	during	the	year,	divided	by	total	assets.	Return	on	assets	(ROA)	is	measured	as	earnings	before	interest	and	tax,	divided	by	total
assets.	Growth	(GT)	is	measured	as	sales	in	year	t	divided	by	sales	in	year	t-1.	Net	equity	issue	is	measured	as	the	change	in	issued	capital	divided	by	start	of	the	period	issued	capital.	Net	debt	issue	is	measured	as	the	change	in	the
sum	of	short	term	debt	and	long	term	debt	divided	by	the	sum	of	the	start	of	period	short	term	debt	plus	long	term	debt.	Cash	flow	(CF)	is	measured	as	cash	flows	from	operating	activities,	divided	by	total	assets.	Cash	reserves	are
measured	as	change	in	cash	and	cash	equivalent	divided	by	the	start	of	the	period	cash	and	cash	equivalent.	Dividends	is	measured	as	change	in	dividends	in	year	t	divided	by	last	year’s	dividends.	Net	trade	credit	is	measured	as
accounts	receivable	less	accounts	payable,	divided	by	total	assets.
3.3	Data	and	Ssample
The	study	sample	initially	contained	all	UK	listed	companies	over	the	period	2004–2009,	where	all	data	was	extracted	from	Datastream.	However,	due	to	various	reasons	we	removed	some	firms	from	our	final	sample.	First,	all
those	 firms	whose	market	 value	was	 not	 reported	 in	UK	Pound	 Sterling	were	 excluded	 from	 the	 sample.	 Second,	 financial	 firms	were	 excluded	 from	 the	 sample	 for	 standard	 reasons.	 Third,	 following	 previous	 literature,	 utility
companies,	such	as	electricity,	gas	and	telephone	were	excluded	from	the	sample	(Brav,	2009;	Duchin	et	al.,	2010;	Chava	and	Purnanandam,	2011;	Lin	and	Paravisini,	2012).	Fourth,	unquoted	firms	and	firms	missing	data	for	the	main
variables	of	the	study	were	excluded	from	the	final	sample.	We	also	adjusted	the	data	for	outliers	by	winsorizing	the	top	and	bottom	1%	of	observations	for	all	variables.	The	final	sample	thus	includes	2039	listed	UK	companies.
3.4	Model	Specification	and	Econometric	Ispecification	and	econometric	issues
We	carried	out	the	Hausman	(1978)	model	specification	test	to	compare	the	outcome	of	fixed	and	random	effects	models	on	the	assumption	that	the	outcome	of	both	models	will	be	similar.	The	model	specification	test	results
confirmed	 the	outcome	of	the	two	sets	of	estimations	as	different	from	each	other.	We	then	compared	the	two	sets	of	results	and	confirmed	the	use	of	fixed	effects	models	as	an	appropriate	method	for	this	investigation	over	and
above	 the	 random	 effects	models.	We	 also	 considered	 other	 econometric	 issues	 such	 as;	 multicollinearity	 and	 heteroscedasticity	 in	 the	 data.	 First,	 for	 taking	 care	 of	 multicollinearity,	 simple	 correlations	 among	 variables	 were
calculated.	 It	has	been	argued	 in	 the	existing	 literature	 that	a	high	correlation	value	would	 indicate	a	 sign	of	multicollinearity	 (Aivazian	et	 al.,	 2005).	As	a	 result,	we	carefully	checked	all	 the	correlations	among	 the	variables	and
confirmed	the	presence	of	no	high	correlation	among	the	variables.	We	also	take	account	of	the	issue	of	heteroscedasticity	in	the	data	by	applying	White	(1980)	consistent	standard	errors	estimates.	The	t-statistics	reported	in	Tables	1–3
are	based	on	robust	standard	errors	estimates,	based	on	White	(1980).
Table	1	Effect	of	Financial	Crisis	on	Leverage	Ratio
alt-text:	Table	1
Variables Model	(3) Model	(4) Model	(5) Model	(6)
Total	Debt Long	term	debt Short	term	debt Trade	credit
ROA −0.126*** −0.002 −0.038*** –––
(−3.99) (−0.26) (−3.58)
Short	term	debt	=	γ0	+	γ11	*ROA	+	γ12*	GT	+	γ2*CR	+	γ31*	GT	*CR	+	γ32*	ROA	*CR	+	εit (5)
Trade	Credit		=	γ0	+	γ11	*CF	+	γ12*	GT	+	γ2*CR	+	γ31*	GT	*CR	+	γ32*	CF	*CR	+	εit (6)
Net	Debt	Issue		=	γ0	+	γ11*ROA	+	γ12*GT	+	γ2*CR	+	γ31*GT*CR	+	γ32*ROA*CR	+	εit (7)
Net	Equity	Issue		=	γ0	+	γ11*ROA	+	γ12*	GT	+	γ2*CR	+	γ31*GT	*CR	+	γ32*ROA*CR	+	εit (8)
Cash	Reserves	=	γ0	+	γ11*CF	+	γ12*	GT	+	γ2*CR	+	γ31*GT	*CR	+	γ32*CF*CR	+	εit (9)
Dividends		=	γ0	+	γ11*ROA	+	γ12*	GT	+	γ2*CR	+	γ31*	GT	*CR	+	γ32*ROA*CR	+	εit (10)
that	
.
GT 0.0002 −0.002** 0.002 0.001
(0.14) (−2.01) (1.04) (0.84)
CF −0.023***
(−2.41)
CR*ROA −0.002 −0.024*** −0.001 –––
(−0.05) (−2.63) (−0.05)
GT*CR 0.009*** 0.004*** −0.001 0.002
(2.77) (2.63) (−0.20) (1.21)
CF*CR −0.027***
(−2.84)
CR −0.013** −0.001 0.004 −0.007***
(−2.32) (−0.31) (0.958) (−3.17)
C 0.288*** 0.111*** 0.055*** 0.114***
(80.72) (75.93) (21.61) (87.83)
R-squared 0.731 0.820 0.594 0.815
F-statistics 9.014 11.59 4.85 14.61
Prob(F-statistics) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
No	of	Obs 7546 5602 7492 7441
Notes:	Where	CR	represents	the	crisis	dummy,	CF	represents	cash	flows	from	operations,	GT	stands	for	sales	growth,	and	ROA	specify	return	on	assets.	During	the	crisis	period	the	effect	on	dependent	variable	is
calculated	by	adding	the	coefficients	of	the	given	variable	and	variable	interacted	with	the	crisis	dummy.	Furthermore,	in	order	to	calculate	the	change	in	response	relative	to	the	pre-crisis	and	crisis	period	and	the
net-response	during	the	crisis	period	the	crisis	dummy	is	interacted	with	control	variables	we	have	added	the	coefficients.	In	addition,	the	pre-crisis	period	is	represented	by	the	non-interacted	variable	coefficients.
Also,	***,	**,	*	specify	1%,	5%	and	10%	levels	of	significance	respectively.
Table	2	Financial	Crisis	and	Firms’	Substitution	to	Alternative	Sources	of	Financ
alt-text:	Table	2
Variables Model	(7) Model	(8) Model	(9) Model	(10)
Net	Debt	Issue Net	Equity	Issue Cash	Reserve Dividends
ROA 0.019 −0.806 ––– 1.382
(0.04) (−0.88) (11.59)
GT −0.012 −1.054** 0.168* 0.401
(−0.17) (−2.06) (1.81) (5.65)***
CF 1.911***
(2.34)
.
ROA*CR −0.076 1.783*** ––– 0.589***
(−0.10) (2.90) (4.029)
GT*CR 0.500** 0.886*** −0.166 0.036
(1.99) (2.37) (−1.22) (0.35)
CF*CR 2.323**
(2.28)
CR −0.505* −2.154*** −0.902*** −0.252**
(−1.67) (−3.50) (−3.98) (−2.305)
C −0.026 2.544*** 1.796** −3.999***
(−0.61) (3.01) (13.35) (−5.328)
R-squared 0.274 0.357 0.318 0.529
F-statistics 1.085 1.326 1.452 2.503
Prob(F-statistics) 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.000
No	of	Obs 5953 5156 7113 2271
Notes:	Where	CR	represents	the	crisis	dummy,	CF	represents	cash	flows	from	operations,	GT	stands	for	sales	growth,	and	ROA	specify	return	on	assets.	During	the	crisis	period	the	effect	on	dependent	variable	is
calculated	by	adding	the	coefficients	of	the	given	variable	and	variable	interacted	with	the	crisis	dummy.	Furthermore,	in	order	to	calculate	the	change	in	response	relative	to	the	pre-crisis	and	crisis	period	and	the
net-response	during	the	crisis	period	the	crisis	dummy	is	interacted	with	control	variables	we	have	added	the	coefficients.	In	addition,	the	pre-crisis	period	is	represented	by	the	non-interacted	variable	coefficients.
Also,	***,	**,	*	specify	1%,	5%	and	10%	levels	of	significance	respectively.
Table	3	The	Effect	of	Financial	Crisis	on	Liquidity	Constraint	and	Unconstraint	Firms
alt-text:	Table	3
Variables Constraint	Firms Unconstraint	Firms
Total	debt Total	debt
ROA −0.109*** −0.088***
(−2.407) (−2.55)
GT 0.002 0.003
(1.428) (1.10)
ROA*CR 0.003 0.010
(0.087) (0.32)
GT*CR 0.012 0.004
(1.344) (0.93)
CR −0.019* 0.003
(−1.650) (0.38)
.
C 0.340*** 0.162***
(92.072) (20.67)
R-squared 0.648 0.565
F-statistics 6.644 4.649
Prob(F-statistics) 0.000 0.000
No	of	Obs 1116 2808
Notes:	Where	CR	represents	the	crisis	dummy,	GT	stands	for	sales	growth,	and	ROA	specify	return	on	assets.	During	the	crisis	period	the	effect	on	dependent	variable	is	calculated	by	adding	the	coefficients	of	the
given	variable	and	variable	interacted	with	the	crisis	dummy.	Furthermore,	in	order	to	calculate	the	change	in	response	relative	to	the	pre-crisis	and	crisis	period	and	the	net-response	during	the	crisis	period	the
crisis	dummy	is	interacted	with	control	variables	we	have	added	the	coefficients.	In	addition,	the	pre-crisis	period	is	represented	by	the	non-interacted	variable	coefficients.	Also,	***,	**,	*	specify	1%,	5%	and	10%
levels	of	significance	respectively.
4	Results	and	Ddiscussions
4.1	Financial	crisis	and	the	debt	structure	of	public	firms
While	examining	the	effect	of	the	credit	crisis	on	the	leverage	ratios	of	public	firms,	we	take	two	steps.	In	the	first	stage,	we	run	the	fixed	effects	regression	model	on	total	debt	ratio	and	then	in	the	second	stage	we	run	the
regression	models	on	short	term	debt,	long	term	debt	and	trade	credit	separately.	This	analytical	strategy	permits	us	to	identify	the	channel	through	which	supply	shocks	travel	and	furthers	our	understanding	of	how	firms	switch
across	credit	sources.
Table	1	presents	results	from	the	estimation	of	model	(3)–(6).	The	results	show	that	the	signs	of	all	the	independent	variables	are	according	to	expectations.	Return	on	assets	(ROA)	has	a	significant,	negative	association	with
capital	structure	in	the	pre-crisis	period.	We	may	assume	that	a	higher	ROA	would	mean	a	higher	cash	flow	in	the	sample	firms	and	the	outcome	is	thus	consistent	with	the	pecking	order	theory	which	suggests	that	the	availability	of
internal	funds	reduces	firm’s	reliance	on	external	finance.	The	coefficient	on	ROA	interacted	with	the	crisis	dummy	variable	is	negative	but	statistically	 insignificant.	It	 is	 interesting	to	note	that	ROA	is	not	significant	 in	the	crisis
period.	The	insignificance	may	suggest	that	public	firms	are	making	financing	decisions	irrespective	of	their	financial	performance	during	the	crisis	period.	These	results	are	in	line	with	Deesomsak	et	al.	(2004)	who	find	that	the	sign	and
significance	of	profitability	vary	in	leverage	regressions	between	the	post	and	pre-crisis	period.	However,	other	studies	are	inconclusive	on	the	effect	of	profitability	on	firms’	financing	decisions	(see	for	example,	Franks	et	al.,	1996;
Krishnan	and	Moyer,	1997;	Fattouh	et	al.,	2005;	Garlappi	and	Yan,	2011).
The	results	further	show	that	the	coefficient	on	the	growth	variable	is	positive	in	both	the	pre-	and	post-crisis	periods.	It	is	however,	significant	only	in	the	crisis	period.	This	suggests	that	during	the	period	of	economic	diversity
firms	in	need	of	external	finance	are	those	which	have	insufficient	internal	funds	for	financing	their	growth.	This	finding	is	consistent	with	findings	of	some	of	the	previous	literature	(see	for	example,	Titman	and	Wessels,	1988;	Krishnan
and	Moyer,	1997;	Michaelas	et	al.,	1999).	However,	the	finding	is	 in	contrast	to	some	of	the	earlier	studies	(see	for	example,	Barclay	and	Smith,	1995;	Rajan	and	Zingales,	1995;	Ozkan,	2001;	Antoniou	et	al.,	2008;	Leary,	2009).	The	 lack	of
significance	of	the	growth	variable	in	the	pre-crisis	period	supports	the	argument	that	growth	does	not	play	a	significant	role	in	the	financing	decisions	of	firms	during	a	normal	time	period.
The	results	also	show	that	the	coefficient	on	the	crisis	dummy	is	negative	and	significant	at	the	5%	level.	The	negative	effect	on	total	debt	ratio	is	evidenced	to	the	effect	that	the	credit	crisis	has	squeezed	the	flow	of	credit	to
these	firms.	Since	total	debt	encompasses	all	forms	of	debt,	including	short	term	debt,	long	term	debt	and	trade	credit,	we	can	plausibly	argue	that	aggregate	external	financing	activities	of	public	firms	reduced	in	response	to	the
exogenous	credit	crisis.	In	this	regard,	Lemmon	and	Roberts	(2010)	find	a	consistent	result	for	firms	with	below	investment	grades.	By	contrast,	our	results	disagree	with	the	findings	of	Lin	and	Paravisini	(2012)	which	suggest	that	credit
contractions	have	no	effects	on	total	debt	ratio.	Similarly,	Campello	et	al.	(2012)	find	that	the	average	line	of	credit	did	not	change	during	the	crisis	period.
The	results	of	model	(3)	do	not	reveal	which	component	of	total	debt	ratio	is	affected	by	the	credit	supply	shock.	To	gain	understanding	of	how	individual	components	of	debt	structure	respond	to	the	credit	supply	shocks,	we
ran	separate	regressions	on	long	term	debt,	short	term	debt	and	trade	credit	as	in	Eqs.	(4)–(6).	In	so	doing,	we	are	able	to	quantify	the	effect	of	substitution	across	the	different	credit	sources.	We	also	focused	on	the	effect	of	the
financial	crisis	with	a	view	to	identify	which	channels	are	affected	the	most	by	the	recent	panic	in	the	financial	markets.
The	fixed	effects	regression	for	model	(4)	is	run	on	long	term	debt.	The	results	in	column	2	of	Table	1,	show	that	coefficient	on	the	crisis	dummy	variable	is	negative,	but	statistically	insignificant.	As	a	result,	robust	conclusion
cannot	be	drawn	from	these	findings.	The	lack	of	significance	may	imply	that	the	crisis	has	not	affected	the	long	term	financing	channel	of	public	firms.	This	result	seems	to	be	inconsistent	with	the	findings	reported	in	Lemmon	and
Roberts	(2010).	They	find	that	supply	contractions	have	negatively	affected	the	long	term	net	debt	issuance	of	the	below-investment-grade	firms.
Next,	we	focus	on	the	short	term	financing	channel.	The	panel	fixed	effects	regression	for	model	(5)	is	run	on	short	term	debt.	Results	from	the	estimation	of	model	(5)	are	presented	in	column	3	of	Table	1,	which	suggest	that
the	coefficient	on	the	crisis	dummy	variable	is	positive,	but	statistically	insignificant	at	the	conventional	level.	The	results	also	suggest	that	the	crisis	has	no	significant	impact	on	the	short	term	financing	channel.	In	other	words,	the
flow	of	short	term	credit	to	large	firms	is	not	significantly	affected	by	the	recent	credit	retrenchments.
Finally,	the	fixed	effects	regression	is	run	on	trade	credit	as	in	model	(6).	The	results	in	column	4	of	Table	1,	show	that	majority	of	the	control	variables	are	significant	with	a	high	R-square	value.	Most	notably,	the	coefficient	of
the	crisis	dummy	is	negative	and	significant	at	the	1%	level.	This	suggests	that	the	flow	of	trade	credit	to	public	firms	is	reduced	during	the	crisis	period.	These	results	are	thus	parallel	to	the	findings	of	Kohler	et	al.	 (2000).	They
examined	the	trade	credit	behaviour	of	the	UK	quoted	firms	in	a	monetary	tightening	conditions,	and	find	that	quoted	firms	received	less	trade	credit	during	the	recession	period.	However,	our	results	are	in	contrast	to	Petersen	and
Rajan	(1997),	Biais	and	Gollier	(1997),	Nilsen	(2002),	and	Ge	and	Qui	(2007)	who	report	that	firms	increase	the	use	of	trade	credit	when	the	supply	of	credit	squeeze.	Overall,	we	argue	that	that	the	flow	of	trade	credit	is	sensitive	to	the
credit	supply	shocks	in	times	of	financial	crisis.
The	results	also	suggest	that	the	coefficient	of	cash	flow	interacted	with	the	crisis	dummy	is	negative	(−0.02)	and	significant	at	the	1%	level.	This	finding	indicates	that	internally	generated	funds	negatively	affect	the	firm’s
demand	for	external	credit	(trade	credit)	during	the	crisis	period.	This	is	consistent	with	the	pecking	order	theory,	i.e.,	the	more	internally	generated	fund	is	available,	the	less	a	firm	needs	external	finance	(trade	credit).	This	finding
implies	that	internal	fund	is	an	important	alternative	to	trade	credit.	This	finding	is	consistent	with	previous	literature	(see	for	example,	Atanasova	and	Wilson,	2003;	Franks	and	Goyal,	2003;	Atanasova	and	Wilson,	2004;	Love	et	al.,	2007).
In	 addition,	 our	 results	 suggest	 the	 lack	 of	 substitution	 towards	 the	 source	 of	 short	 term	 finance.	 The	 reduction	 in	 short	 term	 finance	 implies	 that	 public	 firms	 do	 not	 hedge	 themselves	 from	 the	 effect	 of	 credit	 supply
contractions	by	resorting	to	trade	credit.	This	may	be	because	of	the	availability	of	other	creditable	channels	available	to	these	firms	for	raising	funds	such	as,	issuing	equity,	public	debt	and	commercial	papers	in	open	markets	(Gertler
and	Gilchrist,	1994).	Overall,	our	results	suggest	that	during	the	crisis	period	the	flow	of	trade	credit	was	negatively	affected	due	to	which	public	firms	reduce	the	use	of	short	term	debt	during	the	financial	crisis.
To	sum	up	all	the	above	discussions,	we	argue	that	the	financial	crisis	has	adversely	affected	the	total	debt	ratio	of	public	firms.	Our	investigation	of	the	individual	components	of	debt	structure	reveals	that	the	adverse	impact
of	the	financial	crisis	works	through	the	trade	credit	channel	instead	of	the	short	term	and	long	term	financing	channels.	Our	study	contributes	to	the	existing	literature	by	first	demonstrating	that	both	the	demand	and	supply	factors
are	 integral	parts	of	 the	 firm’s	 financing	decisions.	Second,	 trade	credit	 in	 the	case	of	 listed	 firms	 is	 sensitive	 to	credit	contractions.	Third,	 trade	credit	does	not	compensate	 for	a	 reduction	 in	 the	supply	of	credit	 from	 financial
institutions.	In	the	next	section,	we	focus	on	the	effect	of	credit	supply	shocks	on	firms’	behaviour	about	the	use	of	alternative	sources	of	finance.
4.2	The	Use	of	Alternative	Sources	of	Fuse	of	alternative	sources	of	finance
We	first	examine	firms’	behaviour	of	substituting	to	alternative	sources	of	finance	for	offsetting	the	reduction	in	the	level	of	debt	in	their	capital	structure.	The	alternative	sources	of	finance	in	this	study	refer	to	net	debt	issued,
net	 equity	 issued,	 internal	 finance	and	dividends.	The	 fixed	effects	panel	 regression	 is	 run	 separately	 on	each	of	 these	 variables	 as	defined	by	Eqs.	 (7)–(10),	 for	which	 the	 results	 are	presented	 in	Table	2.	Model	 (7)	 presents	 the
regression	results	on	net	debt	issued.	The	coefficient	of	the	crisis	dummy	is	−0.50	and	is	weakly	significant,	suggesting	that	net	debt	issue	of	public	firms	was	reduced	during	the	crisis	period.	This	result	is	consistent	with	our	earlier
findings	that	contractions	in	credit	supply	have	negatively	affected	the	total	leverage	ratio	of	public	firms.
Model	(8)	presents	the	regression	results	on	net	equity	issued.	It	appears	that	the	crisis	exerts	a	significant	negative	impact	on	net	equity	issued	by	public	firms.	This	is	a	clear	indication	that	public	firms	issue	less	equity
during	the	crisis	period.	This	result	suggests	that	during	the	crisis	period	when	the	market	underperforms,	management	of	firms	hold	back	by	not	issuing	new	equity.	We	can	plausibly	argue	that	equity	finance	is	not	a	substitute	to
other	sources	of	finance	in	the	market	downturn.	These	results	are	in	line	with	some	of	the	existing	studies,	for	instance,	Lemmon	and	Roberts	(2010)	which	find	limited	evidence	of	substitution	towards	equity	finance	in	addition	to	short
term	debt	and	trade	credit.	Our	result,	however,	appears	in	contrast	with	that	of	Leary	(2009)	and	Lin	and	Paravisini	(2013)	which	suggest	that	firms	substitute	to	equity	finance	when	credit	becomes	difficult	to	obtain	from	the	financial
market.
We	next	examine	the	change	in	cash	and	cash	equivalent	and	consider	whether	firms	increase	the	use	of	internal	finance	or	hold	cash	during	the	crisis	period.	The	results	from	the	estimation	of	model	(9)	are	reported	in	column
3	of	Table	2.	We	find	a	highly	significant	and	negative	impact	of	the	crisis	dummy	on	cash	and	cash	equivalent.	This	is	consistent	with	the	expectations	that	firms	reduce	cash	reserve	during	the	crisis	period.	The	reduction	of	cash
reserve	suggests	the	possibility	that	public	listed	firms	increase	the	use	of	internal	funds	to	finance	the	existing	or	essential	operational	and	investment	activities	to	counter	the	adverse	effect	of	credit	supply	contractions.
In	addition,	the	coefficient	of	cash	flow	interacted	with	crisis	dummy	is	positive	and	significant	at	the	level	of	5%.	This	suggests	that	in	order	to	cope	with	adverse	credit	conditions	during	the	crisis	period,	firms	that	generate
positive	internal	cash	flows	kept	higher	cash	reserves.	In	addition,	our	results	show	that	the	interaction	term	of	growth	with	the	crisis	dummy	is	positive	and	highly	significant	at	the	1%	level.	This	result	confirms	our	earlier	finding	that
firms	with	growth	prospects	need	more	external	finance	during	the	crisis	period	when	credit	supply	squeezes.	This	finding	is	also	consistent	with	previous	findings	in	this	area	of	research	(see	for	example,	Chen,	2004;	Colombo,	2001).
Our	results	are,	in	part,	consistent	with	previously	published	studies	in	this	area.	For	example,	Leary	(2009)	argues	that	firms	uses	all	forms	of	alternative	financing	including	internal	finance	when	they	face	restricted	access	to
credit.	Similarly,	Campello	et	al.	(2010)	conduct	a	survey	of	chief	financial	officials	and	conclude	that	firms	burn	more	cash	during	the	crisis	period.	However,	our	results	are	in	contrast	with	Lemmon	and	Roberts	(2010)	who	finds	limited
evidence	on	substitution	among	alternative	sources	of	finance	including	the	use	of	internal	finance.	Overall	our	findings	suggest	that	the	pecking	order	hypothesis	is	also	applicable	to	the	corporate	financing	behaviour	of	public	firms
during	the	financial	crisis	period.
This	 study	 further	 examines	whether	 listed	 firms	 adjust	 their	 dividends	 pay-out	 policy	 during	 the	 crisis	 period.	 It	 is	 generally	 agreed	 that	when	 obtaining	 external	 credit	 becomes	 difficult,	 firms	 scale	 back	 shareholder
distributions	to	maintain	their	cash	positions	and	spending	on	other	essential	operational	and	investment	activities.	The	fixed	effects	regression	model	(10)	is	thus	run	on	change	in	dividends.	The	crisis	dummy	appears	to	be	significant
and	negatively	associated	with	the	change	in	dividends.	This	is	consistent	with	the	expectation	that	public	firms	adjust	their	dividends	policies	by	means	of	reducing	dividends	pay-out	to	retain	their	financial	slack	in	the	economic
downturn.	This	finding	also	is	consistent	with	those	of	Campello	et	al.,	2010	who	argue	that	firms	have	deeper	cut	on	dividends	distributions	during	the	recent	crisis	period.	By	contrast,	Lemmon	and	Roberts	(2010)	find	that	firms	with
below	investment-grade	rating	do	not	dip	into	cash	reserve	nor	reduce	dividends	pay-out	to	counter	the	possible	adverse	effects	of	the	crisis.	Our	result	provides	evidence	complementing	the	above	studies	by	suggesting	that	dividends
pay-out	of	public	firms	is	sensitive	to	the	credit	market	conditions.
In	addition,	we	have	also	classified	the	sample	firms	into	liquidity-constraint	group	and	liquidity-unconstraint	groups	on	the	basis	of	their	average	pre-crisis	liquidity	position.	In	line	with	previous	literature	in	this	area,	we	used
cash	and	cash	equivalent	as	a	measure	of	liquidity	(see	for	example,	Duchin	et	al.,	2010;	Love	et	al.,	2007).	First,	we	identified	all	those	firms	in	the	sample	whose	cash	and	cash	equivalent	as	a	fraction	of	total	assets	was	less	than	or
equal	to	the	sample	mean	and	classified	it	as	the	liquidity-constraint	group.	Second,	we	formed	another	group	of	firms	whose	average	cash	and	cash	equivalent	figure	as	a	fraction	of	total	assets	was	greater	than	the	sample	mean	and
classified	it	as	liquidity	unconstraint	firms.
In	this	regard,	earlier	studies	suggest	that	firms,	which	have	greater	ex	ante	liquidity,	are	less	exposed	to	the	financial	shocks	(see	for	example,	Love	et	al.,	2007;	 	Duchin	et	al.,	2010;	Denis,	2011).	Similarly,
Gao	and	Yun	(2009)	find	supportive	evidence	to	the	effect	that	the	financial	crisis	of	2008	has	a	more	pronounced	impact	on	the	performance	of	firms	with	low	liquidity	compared	to	those	with	high	liquidity	prior	to	the	crisis.	We
hypothesize	that	firms	with	high	cash	reserve	prior	to	the	crisis	are	in	a	better	position	to	cushion	themselves	from	the	negative	credit	supply	shocks.	To	test	this	prediction,	we	run	separate	regressions	on	the	two	groups	using	the
fixed	effects	regression.	The	results	reported	in	Table	3,	highlight	that	financial	crisis	has	adversely	affected	the	total	debt	ratio	of	liquidity-constraint	firms;	however,	its	effect	on	the	unconstraint	firms	is	statistically	insignificant	which
reveal	that	liquidity-constraint	firms	are	hit	harder	by	the	financial	crisis	in	comparison	to	unconstraint	firms.	These	findings	are	consistent	with	the	existing	literature	concerning	the	credit	supply	effect.
In	addition,	as	a	robustness	check	we	removed	all	those	firms	from	the	sample	which	have	a	direct	exposure	to	the	subprime	crisis,	such	as	real	estate	firms,	and	re-run	all	the	regressions.	This	enabled	us	to	minimize	any
demand	side	factors	which	would	otherwise	affect	our	results	(Chava	and	Purnanandam,	2011;	Lin	and	Paravisini,	2012).	The	revised	results	are	qualitatively	similar	to	those	reported	in	the	above	tables.	We	therefore	argue	that	the
results	of	this	study	which	are	drawn	from	the	estimation	of	our	models	are	not	driven	by	the	demand	side	factors.2	The	robustness	check	also	strengthens	the	claims	that	we	put	forward	in	relation	to	the	findings	and	implications	of
this	research.
In	summary,	our	results	appear	to	have	identified	that	the	financial	crisis	has	adversely	affected	the	total	debt	ratio	of	publicly	listed	firms.	The	results	further	reveal	that	financial	crisis	works	through	the	trade	credit	channel
instead	of	the	short	term	and	long	term	debt	channels.	In	order	to	counter	the	adverse	effect	of	the	financial	crisis,	public	firms	increase	the	use	of	internal	finance	and	scale	back	dividends	payments	which	is	consistent	with	it	being
part	of	the	initiative	for	preserving	their	financial	slack.	The	sample	firms,	however,	do	not	substitute	to	the	external	sources	of	finance	including	net	debt	issue,	equity	finance	and	trade	credit	in	the	market	downturn.	In	addition,	the
crisis	has	hit	liquidity	constraint	firms	much	harder	than	the	liquidity	unconstraint	firms.	We	therefore	stress	on	the	need	for	using	effective	financial	management	techniques	by	all	firms	in	stable	as	well	as	adverse	credit	conditions.
This	is	in	line	with	Mac	an	Bhaird	(2013)	who	argues	that	during	the	crisis	period	effective	financial	management	techniques	are	specifically	beneficial	for	those	firms	which	heavily	rely	on	external	financing	in	their	operations	because
these	firms	are	fully	exposed	to	the	negative	effects	of	the	crisis.
5	Conclusion
This	study	examines	the	contemporary	effect	of	the	financial	crisis	on	the	financial	policies	of	UK	publicly	listed	firms	and	assesses	its	impacts	on	the	individual	components	of	the	debt	structure.	We	adopt	firm	fixed	effects
model	as	our	empirical	strategy	 for	 this	 investigation.	Using	a	sample	of	2039	UK	public	 firms	over	 the	period	2004–2009,	we	 find	 that	credit	supply	shocks	have	adversely	affected	 the	 total	debt	 ratio	of	publicly	 listed	 firms.	 In
addition,	our	results	also	suggest	that	the	credit	supply	contractions	have	impaired	the	trade	credit	channel	of	public	firms.	In	contrast,	there	is	little	evidence	to	suggest	that	the	financial	crisis	had	an	impact	on	the	short	term	and
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long	term	debt	financing	channels	of	public	firms.
The	outcome	of	our	findings	thus	suggests,	that	in	order	to	counter	the	adverse	effect	of	credit	contractions,	public	firms	increased	the	use	of	internal	finance	and	adjusted	their	dividend	policy	by	deferring	the	payment	of
dividends	to	shareholders.	We	however,	did	not	find	any	evidence	in	relation	to	public	firms’	substitution	to	the	use	of	net	debt	issue,	net	equity	issue	and/or	trade	credit	during	the	financial	crisis	period.	In	addition,	our	results	also
reveal	that	liquidity-constraint	firms	with	lower	cash	reserves	prior	to	the	crisis	suffered	more	during	tight	lending	conditions.	As	a	robustness	check	all	the	regression	models	were	re-estimated	without	the	inclusion	of	firms	which	has
direct	exposure	to	the	credit	crisis	(such	as	real	estate	firms).	The	results	remained	qualitatively	similar	to	those	reported	in	the	paper	suggesting	that	our	results	are	not	driven	by	the	demand	side	factors.	Our	overall	findings	thus
appear	to	suggest	that	the	financial	policies	of	public	firms	are	exposed	to	variations	in	the	supply	of	credit	in	the	course	of	the	financial	crisis,	which,	by	implication,	may	pose	a	threat	to	their	operations,	sustainability	and	growth	in
the	future.
In	light	of	the	evidence	presented	in	this	study,	we	argue	the	findings	of	this	study	have	several	implications.	First,	our	evidence	describes	and	explains	the	benefits	of	applying	effective	financing	policies	by	public	firms,	which
helped	them,	manage	their	financing	needs	well	during	difficult	times.	This	finding	has	implications	for	all	publicly	listed	firms,	suggesting	that	liquidity-constraint	firms	can	use	different	financing	channels	for	effectively	managing	the
negative	effects	of	 financial	crisis.	Second,	 in	terms	of	successfully	managing	the	liquidity-constraint	firms’	financial	position	we	argue	that	management	of	these	companies	should	apply	effective	financial	management	policies	 in
stable	business	environments,	which	will	be	beneficial	to	them	in	preparing	more	effectively	for	managing	their	 finances	well	during	difficult	economic	conditions.	Third,	our	findings	document	the	 impact	and	implications	of	non-
availability	of	external	finance	on	the	operations,	sustainability	and	growth	of	public	companies.	As	publicly	listed	companies	play	a	significant	role	in	the	sustainability	and	growth	of	our	economy	and	society,	we	argue	that	the	findings
of	this	research	have	implications	for	future	financial	regulation	and	policy	making	in	the	UK.
This	study	explored	the	effects	of	the	financial	crisis	on	firms’	financial	policies	on	the	basis	of	annual	panel	data.	However,	a	number	of	studies	have	suggested	that	quarterly	data	can	best	capture	subtle	changes	of	the	time
series	between	the	shorter	periods	(see	for	example,	Duchin	et	al.,	2010;	Chava	and	Purnanandam,	2011,	2011;	Murfin,	2012).	However,	due	to	the	non-availability	of	quarterly	data	for	the	main	variables	of	this	study,	we	regard	the
use	of	quarterly	data	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper.	The	application	of	quarterly	data	in	relation	to	investigating	the	effects	of	financial	crisis	on	the	financial	policies	of	UK	public	firms	is	therefore	left	to	future	research.	Moreover,
the	influences	which	we	analyse	in	this	paper	can	be	pursued	into	the	role	of	relationship	lending	on	the	financing	policies	of	firms	during	the	crisis	period.	Evidence	in	the	existing	literature	suggests	that	during	the	crisis	period,
maintaining	a	long	term	relationship	with	lenders	would	enable	firms	to	pay	lower	interest	rates	and	offer	little	or	no	collateral	for	receiving	loans	(Boot	and	Thakor,	1994;	Ioannidou 	and	Ongena,	2010).	An	examination	of	the	role	of
relationship	lending	during	the	financial	crisis	period	would	be	worth	investigating	in	future	research.
In	addition,	as	highlighted	by	Lawson	(2009)	existing	theoretical	frameworks	used	by	current	research	papers	are	insufficient	for	explaining	the	causes	of	the	crisis.	In	line	with	this,	as	the	research	models	of	this	paper	are
based	on	certain	assumptions	which	may	influence	the	results	of	the	paper,	 	concrete	conclusions	cannot	be	drawn	from	these	results.	The	use	of	alternative	methodologies	are	therefore	expected	to	produce	new	insights
in	this	area.	As	this	research	covers	an	 important	aspect	of	our	society,	 the	application	of	social	 theory	that	covers	different	key	paradigms	about	the	nature	of	social	science	and	society	as	a	whole	will	be	beneficial	 (Burrell	and
Morgan,	1979).	The	use	of	triangulation	method	in	future	research	is	therefore	expected	to	help	in	enhancing	our	understanding	of	the	issues	covered	in	this	paper	(see	Downward,	2016).	We	therefore	argue	that	for	producing	an	in-
depth	understanding	of	the	causes	of	the	financial	crisis	a	more	sophisticated	framework	containing	the	application	of	theoretical	approaches	from	other	disciplines	will	be	beneficial.
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